

By Strategic Studies Centre

GEOSTRATA

August 2026



STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE

*Recalibrating the Security Partnerships
in a Fragmenting Global Order*



Contents

01-02

Introduction

03-04

**Conceptual and Analytical
Framework**

05-06

**Evolving European Security
Environment and Partnership
Diversification**

07

**India as an Emerging Security
and Defense Partner**

08

**Opportunities and Strategic Value
of EU-India Defense Industrial
Cooperation**



Contents

09

**Maritime Security Cooperation
in the Indo-Pacific**

10

**Defense Manufacturing and
Industrial Collaboration**

11

**Cyber security and Hybrid
Threat Cooperation**

12

**Challenges to Deeper India-EU
Cooperation and Way Forward**



To download the full report,
visit: thegeostrata.com



INTRODUCTION

European security architecture in particular is undergoing a period of recalibration, which was long underpinned by transatlantic cooperation.

In the last few years, especially after Covid-19, the world order has been fragmented with strategic uncertainty and gradual erosion of persisting traditional security arrangements. The post-Cold War liberal international order, which often relied on stable alliances, multilateralism, and most important of all, predictable responsible leadership by major powers, is being transformed into a more contested landscape.¹ Amid such global flux, countries and groupings are diversifying the forms of cooperation by reassessing traditional security dependencies to enhance strategic flexibility.

European security architecture in particular is undergoing a period of recalibration, which was long underpinned by transatlantic cooperation. While established mechanisms and treaties remain operational, shifting geopolitical realities, along with evolving threat perceptions and, most important of all, changing international political dynamics, are prompting European policymakers to place greater emphasis on defense readiness, "European sovereignty," and industrial self-sufficiency.² This development is not a rejection of existing security frameworks but a pragmatic effort to adapt to uncertainty by expanding the range of strategic partnerships.





Amid such a shift, the European Union (EU) has articulated the need to engage with reliable partners to address the conventional as well as non-traditional security challenges.³ Challenges pertaining to maritime security, cyber & hybrid security, and supply-chain vulnerabilities in defence production demand cooperation beyond traditional alliance structures. In this context, India, as an emerging power with a growing defence industrial base, proves to be a relevant partner for strategic cooperation.⁴ With initiatives such as Aatmanirbhar Bharat and Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, India is expanding export capabilities along with becoming an established regional security player, especially in the Indo-Pacific.⁵ With this, India becomes a compatible counterpart for the EU's evolving security posture.

Apart from defence industrial capabilities, the growing strategic convergence between India and the EU is strengthened by their shared commitment to a rules-based international order, freedom of navigation, and commitment to multilateral problem-solving.⁶ Both India and EU, are facing increasingly complex security environments which are being shaped by technological disruption, geopolitical competition and transnational threats.

This paper aims to examine the evolving scope of India-EU defence and security cooperation by addressing three central questions. First, how the fluctuating international security environment, especially across the Atlantic, is reshaping the EU's approach to external partnerships. Second, how India is positioned to become a key partner for the EU. Finally, what forms of cooperation, particularly in defence industrial collaboration, offer the greatest potential for mutual benefit? By focusing on India-EU cooperation as a complementary adaptive strategy, this study argues that deeper engagement enhances resilience in an uncertain global order.





Conceptual and Analytical Framework

In an anarchic international system, alliance formation becomes a tool for self-help by which countries protect themselves.

To understand the evolution of India-EU defence cooperation requires an analytical framework that transcends traditional alliance-centric perspectives. Classical international relations theories, such as realism, have largely emphasised formal alliances as the primary mechanism through which states ensure security.⁷ In an anarchic international system, alliance formation becomes a tool for self-help by which countries protect themselves. However, the contemporary environment, which is in a constant state of fluctuation, reflects conditions of uncertainty which necessitates conceptual tools that explain flexible, issue-based cooperation.

The initial point of analysis would be the concept of alliance uncertainty, where the reliability or scope of existing security guarantees becomes ambiguous. During such conditions, states do not necessarily abandon established frameworks, but instead they seek to mitigate the risk through diversification of partnerships.⁸ In international politics the alliance uncertainty encourages the supplementary forms of cooperation which may operate alongside the existing institutional arrangements.





Recently, during the Munich Security Conference 2026, President Emmanuel Macron of France said in his speech, “If we want to be taken seriously on the European continent and beyond, we must show the world our unwavering commitment to defend our own interests,” highlighting his vision of European sovereignty, or strategic autonomy.⁹ Strategic autonomy here does not imply isolation.¹⁰ Rather, it denotes the capacity to make independent political and military decisions. From this perspective, autonomy is relational, which means, it is achieved not only through internal capacity-building but also through cultivating reliable partnerships that reduce overdependence on any single actor, especially the United States of America.

Another conceptual notion is that of *security substitution* which refers to the process in the international system by which actors supplement traditional security arrangements with alternative cooperation to compensate for the perceived strategic gaps. The said security substitution works as a functional mechanism where it introduces complementary mechanisms, such as defence industrial cooperation and joint capability development, that enhances resilience.¹¹ Further, whenever the India-EU defence cooperation is in question, at the international stage this cooperation operates as a form of adaptive institutional balancing. While the EU gets access to diversified defence manufacturing, India gets support for its industrial upgrading and market diversification in terms of defence exports.¹²





Evolving European Security Environment and Partnership Diversification

European strategic thinking has shifted toward resilience, adaptability, and diversification.

In the last few years, the European security environment has undergone significant transformation. This has been shaped by the convergence of geopolitical and structural factors.¹³ Up until now, while Europe benefited from the established institutions, the assumptions of predictable alliance commitments and uninterrupted supply chains have come into question due to the sudden geopolitical and geoeconomical flux during Trump 2.0. Consequently, European strategic thinking has shifted toward resilience, adaptability, and diversification. The remarks, mentioned above by the French president, are the case in example.

A defining feature of this environment is the recognition of strategic vulnerability. With Russia attacking Ukraine in 2022, there is a resurgence of high-intensity conflict on the continent. This conflict was also amplified by the proliferation of hybrid threats and weaponization of economic interdependence that have underscored the limits of traditional deterrence mechanisms.¹⁴ Now, security is being understood in comprehensive terms, integrating military, economic and technological dimensions. In response to these threats, the EU has intensified efforts to strengthen its defence readiness, such as improving military mobility, coordinating capability development and reinforcing industrial production.¹⁵ These efforts, which we are about to discuss, are not necessarily directed toward disengagement from allies, but they are, in a way, steps to reduce structural dependencies by improving crisis response capabilities.





Polymakers across the EU are recognising that effective security requires engagement with a wider range of partners which are capable of contributing to stability.¹⁶ This call for partnership diversification has led the EU to explore relationships beyond its traditional ones. The Indo-Pacific region has become a region of strategic interest for the EU due to its economic centrality for global trade and fluctuating security dynamics. Growing European interest in the region reflects an understanding of the interconnectedness of the security challenges. Rather than rigid alliances which were prevalent in the cold-war era, today, the EU favors pragmatic partnerships.¹⁷ As Europe seeks to balance continuity with adaptation of partnerships that support resilience without undermining autonomy, this evolving geoconomical environment provides structural conditions for deeper India-EU cooperation.





India as an Emerging Security and Defense Partner

A defining feature of India's growing strategic culture is India's emphasis and practice of strategic autonomy.

Over the decades India has transitioned from an import intensive economy to a country with an export-orientation. Even in the defence manufacturing, India has expanded its industrial capabilities boosting its credibility as a stability provider beyond its immediate borders.¹⁸ A defining feature of India's growing strategic culture is India's emphasis and practice of strategic autonomy. This provides India with flexibility, making it a suitable partner for the EU, which also seeks to balance cooperation with autonomy.¹⁹ India's defence industrial transformation in the last few years have also strengthened its appeal as a strong defence partner. Along with government investment, the emergence of a robust private defence sector has created a diversified ecosystem. This ecosystem is oriented towards co-development and co-production that closely aligns with European objectives for supply-chain diversification.²⁰

With the extensive naval experience along with regional coordination capabilities, India has grown in strategic significance in terms of maritime security. India is a key contributor to Indo-Pacific stability. Its emphasis on freedom of navigation and cooperative governance resonates deeply with European interests.²¹ Above all, India's experience with counterterrorism, cyber security, and disaster response reflects a multidimensional understanding of security capabilities that are compatible with the EU's approach. India also positioned itself not as an alternative to existing mechanisms but as a complementary partner which reduces strategic friction and enhances the political sustainability of cooperation.





Opportunities and Strategic Value of EU-India Defense Industrial Cooperation

Joint venture and co-development allow for technology sharing and risk distribution.

In an era where military effectiveness depends on production capacity supplanted by supply-chain resilience, industrial collaboration becomes central to strategic autonomy.²² Today, European defence industries face many challenges including underinvestment, fragmented production and limited surge capacity.²³ The recent geopolitical developments have exposed vulnerabilities in terms of ammunition stockpiles intensifying the EU's search for reliable industrial partners. Here, where India's defence ecosystem presents complementary strengths. In the last few years, policy reforms have expanded manufacturing in the aerospace, land and ammunition systems. The diversified industrial landscape which features competitive private firms, positions India to contribute to European defence requirements, in a way where scalability and cost efficiency are critical.²⁴

Strategically, the industrial cooperation aligns with European objectives to reduce dependence. Joint venture and co-development allow for technology sharing and risk distribution. Public-private partnerships are central to this, where governments provide regulatory support and private firms drive innovation fostering long-term interdependence and interoperability.²⁵ These industrial partnerships are also politically sustainable for they allow incremental deepening of ties without the friction of formal alliances.





Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

The EU's limited permanent naval presence necessitates cooperation with regional partners such as India.

As the global trade relies on secure sea lanes, maritime stability becomes a shared priority and responsibility. The Indo-Pacific proves to be a focal point due to its economic centrality and security challenges.²⁶ For the EU, engagement in the Indo-Pacific reflects an expanding security understanding of the fact that how European economies are intertwined with Indo-Pacific routes, making freedom of navigation essential.

The EU's limited permanent naval presence necessitates cooperation with regional partners such as India.²⁷ With established surveillance capabilities and role in regional cooperation, India is central to the security of India ocean and Indo-Pacific. Its emphasis on cooperative governance aligns with European preferences.²⁸ The same is being enhanced through mechanisms of institutionalized dialogues which have facilitated coordination on anti-piracy and sea lanes protection and joint naval exercise that have contributed to interoperability. Joint infrastructure development such as port modernization, integrates economic and strategic consideration where maritime cooperation allows for gradual engagement of India-EU coordination.²⁹





Defense Manufacturing and Industrial Collaboration

European shortages in terms of ammunition production have necessitated the need for a reliable partners.

Defense manufacturing collaboration directly addresses structural constraints like production capacity and supply-chain resilience. European industries who are facing limitations in scalability and regulatory complexity, seek partners to supplement their manufacturing capabilities.³⁰ India's defence ecosystem which is bolstered by reforms promoting domestic production and exports, offers a solution in this case. Indian firms now produce ammunition, aerospace components, and naval platforms with competitive cost structures.³¹ Joint ventures between Indian and European firms can facilitate co-production, allowing European diversification and Indian integration into global and European value chains.

The Ukraine war highlighted the importance of ammunition during the battle. European shortages in terms of ammunition production have necessitated the need for a reliable partners. Over the last few years, Indian firms have demonstrated the capacity to supply compatible products. In the global market there is a strong demand for Indian manufactured explosives such as TNT, RDX and HMX.³² Cooperation in this domain fosters trust and interoperability, simultaneously enhancing innovation capacity through joint R&D in emerging technologies.³³





Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threat Cooperation

Cooperation on dual-use technologies, such as AI and Data analytics, supports technological resilience.

In the modern age where battlefield has transcended into the public domain, cybersecurity and hybrid threats blur boundaries between military and civilian domains.³⁴ The frequency of cyber intrusions and disinformation underscores the need for cooperative approaches. Cybersecurity is core to EU's defence policy which recognize vulnerabilities in infrastructure and institutions. India faces similar challenges due to rapid digital transformation in the country. India's experience in managing digital ecosystems and growing cyber expertise can pave the way for greater cooperation in the domain.³⁵ Cooperation on dual-use technologies, such as AI and Data analytics, supports technological resilience.

However, the different regulatory frameworks can impede integration. The India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which was concluded recently highlights the need for the greater integration in these domains.³⁶ The cyber cooperation exemplifies the value of flexible partnerships that addresses transnational threats without engaging in the sensitivities of military alignment.³⁷





Challenges to Deeper India-EU Cooperation and Way Forward

To translate convergence into effective cooperation, specific policy pathways are required.

Despite the potentiality of growing convergence between India and EU, there lies structural and political constraints which might limit the cooperation.³⁸ First and most important of all, the divergent strategic priorities, where Europe focuses on territorial defence and its neighborhood, while India prioritizes the Indo-Pacific. Second, the regulatory barriers in defence industries, such as EU export controls and India's procurement processes, supplemented by technological sensitivity and intellectual property concerns, can slow the collaboration.³⁹ Further, the political fragmentation within the EU and bureaucratic coordination issues in India can hinder joint initiatives. India and EU have differences in military doctrines which can limit the operational interoperability. Addressing these challenges requires calibrated and incremental approaches.⁴⁰

To translate convergence into effective cooperation, specific policy pathways are required. The first and foremost step is deepening institutionalization.⁴¹ Existing dialogues need dedicated implementation mechanisms.⁴² Joint working groups on maritime security or manufacturing with deliverables would reduce the fragmentation. These working groups will create an ecosystem, that will move from project-based collaboration to comprehensive integration. Joint investment in production facilities and testing infrastructure can reduce vulnerabilities. In the end, there is a need to expand low-risk military engagement through joint training and tabletop exercises in humanitarian assistance or cyber response to build confidence among forces.

Rather than a departure from existing frameworks, the India-EU engagement emerges as a pragmatic response to evolving security challenges and strategic needs.⁴³ While constraints regarding threat perceptions and regulations exist, they necessitate careful policy design rather than prevention of engagement. In the time of global geopolitical flux, the India-EU cooperation offers a model for complementary security engagement where actors adapt to alliance uncertainty by diversifying partnerships to navigate a complex encompassing landscape.





References

1. G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94, no.1 (2018):7–23, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/7/4762691> (accessed March 1, 26)
2. G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94, no.1 (2018):7–23, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/7/4762691> (accessed March 1, 26)
3. European Union External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: EEAS, 2016), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf (accessed March 1, 2026).
4. European Union External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (Brussels: EEAS, 2016), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf (accessed March 1, 2026).
5. "MISSION SAGAR." n. <https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspxPRID=1796165&lang=2>.
6. European Commission, *Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy on India* (Brussels, 2018), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN:2018:28:FIN> (accessed March 1, 2026).
7. European Commission, *Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy on India* (Brussels, 2018), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN:2018:28:FIN> (accessed March 1, 2026).
8. Victor D. Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
9. Europe Has to Become a Geopolitical Power, Says President | France in the United Kingdom." n.d. <https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/europe-has-become-geopolitical-power-says-president>.
10. Daniel Fiott, "Strategic Autonomy: Towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?" EUISS Brief (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2018), <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-autonomy-towards-european-sovereignty-defence> (accessed March 1, 2026).

11. Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
12. S. Jaishankar, *The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World* (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2020).
13. Sven Biscop, “The New Force Model: NATO’s European Army?” Egmont Institute Policy Brief (Brussels: Egmont Institute, 2022), <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/egmont-brief-nato-european-army.pdf> (accessed March 1, 26)
14. Jan Techau, “The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe,” *Carnegie Europe* (2015), <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/11/09/politics-of-2-percent-nato-and-security-vacuum-in-europe-pub-61733> (accessed March 1, 2026).
15. Council of the European Union, *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence* (Brussels, 2022), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-2022_en (accessed March 1, 2026).
16. European Parliament, *EU-India: Trade Prospects and Challenges* (Brussels: Directorate-General for External Policies, 2021), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/653626/EXPO_BRI\(2021\)653626_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/653626/EXPO_BRI(2021)653626_EN.pdf) (accessed March 1, 2026).
17. European Union, *The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Joint Communication*(2021), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/uri=JOIN:2021:24:FIN> (accessed March 1, 2026).
18. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, *Year End Review 2022* (New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, 2022), <https://pib.gov.in> (accessed March 1, 2026).
19. Harsh V. Pant and Abhijit Rej, “India’s Evolving Naval Strategy,” *RUSI Journal* (2018), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2018.1457380> (accessed March 1, 2026).
20. Laxman Kumar Behera, *India’s Defence Economy: Planning, Budgeting, Industry and Procurement* (London: Routledge, 2021).
21. David Brewster, *India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
22. Lucie Béraud-Sudreau et al., “The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies,” SIPRI Fact Sheet (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2020), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/fs_2012_top_100.pdf (accessed March 1, 2026).

23. European Defence Agency, *Defence Data 2020–2021* (Brussels: EDA, 2022), <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/eda-defence-data-report-2021.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2026).
24. Tyler Cowen, “India’s Potential in Global Defense Supply Chains,” *Bloomberg* (2021), <https://www.bloomberg.com> (accessed March 1, 2026).
25. Bastian Giegerich and Johannes Vüllers, “European Defence Cooperation: The State of Play,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (2021), <https://www.iiss.org> (accessed March 1, 2026).
26. Pietro Canonico and Alessio Patalano, *Seapower in the Post-Modern World* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022).
27. James Rogers, “European (British and French) Geostrategy in the Indo-Pacific,” *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* (2019), <https://www.tandfonline.com> (accessed March 1, 2026).
28. Abhijit Singh, *India’s Maritime Strategy* (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2019).
29. Gulshan Sachdeva, *India-EU Relations in the 21st Century* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
30. Jean-Pierre Maulny, “The Impact of COVID-19 on the European Defense Market,” ARES Group (2020), <https://www.aresgroup.be> (accessed March 1, 2026).
31. Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers, Capabilities of Indian Private Industry (New Delhi: SIDM, 2022), <https://sidm.in> (accessed March 1, 2026).
32. Manu Pubby, “India’s Growing Ammunition Exports to Europe,” *Economic Times* (2024), <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com> (accessed March 1, 2026).
33. Sanjeev Miglani, “Barriers to Defense Trade: The India-EU Context,” *Reuters* (2021), <https://www.reuters.com> (accessed March 1, 2026).
34. Shashank Chawla, “Cyber Security and the Indo-Pacific,” *Carnegie India* (2020), <https://carnegieindia.org> (accessed March 1, 2026).
35. Data Security Council of India, *India Cyber Security Report* (New Delhi, 2022), <https://www.dsci.in> (accessed March 1, 2026).
36. Department of commerce, Government of India. 2026. “Text of India - EU FTA - Mcommerce.” Mcommerce. February 27, 2026.

36. Department of commerce, Government of India. 2026. "Text of India - EU FTA - Mcommerce." Mcommerce. February 27, 2026. <https://www.commerce.gov.in/international-trade/trade-agreements/text-of-india-eu-fta/>.
37. Anirban Basu, "Data Localization and the Future of Digital Trade," The Diplomat (2020), <https://thediplomat.com> (accessed March 1, 2026).
38. Rajendra K. Jain, *India and the European Union in a Changing World* (New Delhi: Aakar Books, 2019).
39. Defence Research and Development Organisation, *Technology Transfer Guidelines* (New Delhi: DRDO, 2021), <https://www.drdo.gov.in> (accessed March 1, 2026).
40. Nandan Unnikrishnan, "The Russia Factor in India-EU Relations," ORF Commentary (2022)
41. Gauri Khandekar, "Building a Sustainable India-EU Partnership," FRIDE Policy Brief (2020)
42. BusinessEurope, *Strengthening EU-India Defence Industrial Cooperation* (Brussels, 2021)
43. Thierry Tardy, "The EU and India: Security Partners in the Making?" EUISS Brief (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2021)

Report Team

At Strata

Author

Darshan Gajjar, is the Director of the Research Division at the Geostrata. He is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Institute of Language Studies and Applied Social Sciences, The CVM University, and a PhD Scholar at the Centre for International Relations, School of International Studies and Diaspora, Gujarat University.

Designers of Strata

Aditi Shree, is a Junior Associate at The Geostrata whose interests lie in international relations, diplomatic history, art, and culture.

A. Shreya Lakshmi, a Senior Associate at the Geostrata. Her interests lie in the realms of Social sector, Economics, and International Relations.

Tanu Vijayvargiya, is a Junior Associate at The Geostrata with a keen interest in international relations, strategic affairs, diplomatic studies, sociology, history, and politics.

GEOSTRATA

Centre for Strategic Studies



NATIONAL SECURITY



MARITIME DESK



CHINA DESK



CYBERSECURITY



NEIGHBORHOOD DESK



NUCLEAR STUDIES



Pillars
of **CREATION**

For a Distinctly Indian Take on World Affairs

Pillars *of* CREATION

For a Distinctly Indian Take on World Affairs

The Geostrata, with a commitment to fostering a comprehensive understanding of global dynamics and thereby promoting a distinctly Indian take on world affairs, has structured its expertise into distinct pillars of creation. These pillars represent a synthesis of profound research, informed perspectives, and proactive engagement in each domain.

In our "Strategic Studies" division, we delve into critical issues ranging from national security challenges, such as aerospace threats and terrorism, to focused areas like maritime and cybersecurity. Recognizing the pivotal role of international relations, our "Diplomacy" pillar spans geographic-specific desks, ensuring we maintain a nuanced perspective on global interactions.

Our commitment to sustainable futures is evident in our "Environment" section, where we tackle everything from energy security to biodiversity conservation. Meanwhile, the "Trade and Development" segment ensures a comprehensive understanding of both global trade dynamics and intricate nuances of India's economic sectors.

The "History and Culture Desk" stands as a testament to our belief in the importance of understanding our past, rich cultural heritage, and linguistic diversities. With the rapid advancements in the technological sphere, our "Science and Technology" division remains at the forefront, analyzing developments from nanotechnology to AI.

Acknowledging the intricate weave of governance, our "Politics and Law" pillar delves deep into domestic and international legal frameworks and political landscapes. Similarly, the "Infrastructure" section focuses on the bedrock of urban and rural landscapes, ensuring we remain informed about key developmental facets.

Our endeavor to remain at the cutting edge is further cemented with our "Space Desk," where space exploration and technology come to the forefront. Lastly, our additional centers like the "Problem Identifier Center" and "Graphics Innovation Center" underscore our commitment to innovation, risk management, and holistic analysis.

Together, these pillars underscore The Geostrata's unwavering dedication to understanding and interpreting the world in its multifaceted complexity.

Team Pillars of Creation



Our Socials

Click on the icons to interact



**Subscribe to
our newsletter at
THEGEOSTRATA.COM**
For a Distinctly Indian Take on World Affairs

@THEGEOSTRATA




ENGAGE
with Strata



@COVERINGCHINA



@COVERINGISRO



@COVERINGMEA



@COVERINGGPM

To download the full report,
visit: thegeostrata.com



JOIN US

Scan the QR code to
fill out the 'Join us' Form

By Strategic Studies Centre

GEOSTRATA

August 2026

STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE

*Recalibrating the Security Partnerships
in a Fragmenting Global Order*