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INDIA-EU FTA

*The Economic and Geopolitical Implications
of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement*

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of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement*

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Abstract

The findings reveal differential benefits across European industries as well as asymmetric impacts in foreign economies, fundamentally altering the map of automotive global value chains.

The European Union-India Free Trade Agreement (EU-India FTA), signed on January 27, 2026 after more than two decades of negotiations represents an inflection point in both trade and geopolitical priorities of the two partners. Using data from the WITS and COMEXT databases, this study employs a partial equilibrium model to estimate the expected change in EU exports of motor vehicles (HS-4 8703) and components (HS-4 8708) to India, outlining the expected effects from new trade created, trade diversion, and price effects in global value chains. The findings reveal differential benefits across European industries as well as asymmetric impacts in foreign economies, fundamentally altering the map of automotive global value chains.






Introduction

The negotiations faced challenges because of disagreements over high tariffs, market access, intellectual property, the automotive industry, and regulatory standards.

The EU-India relationship dates back to the 1960s, with India among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community. Over the decades, the relationship developed after the reformation and liberalisation of India's economy in 1991. In 1994, the EU-India Cooperation Agreement established a foundational treaty of a formal framework for political, economic, and development cooperation between the two.

In 2004, the EU-India Strategic Partnership bolstered a formal partnership that created a political framework to deepen cooperation across political, security, and economic domains, which extended the stage to formal summits. The 7th India-EU Summit in 2006 paved the way for more comprehensive trade negotiations, which resulted in the 2007 EU-India Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) that focused on a formal Free Trade Agreement that extensively covers goods, services, investment, and regulations. The negotiations faced challenges because of disagreements over high tariffs, market access, intellectual property, the automotive industry, and regulatory standards. Negotiations from both ends slowed and eventually stalled in 2013, resulting in the stagnation of the EU-India FTA until 2022 due to the unresolved diplomatic differences regarding the FTA.





In 2022, the leaders of the EU and India reached a common consensus to resume the talks on trade agreements to diversify supply chain rearrangements post COVID-19 and China's dominance. The initiative came into light after the EU-India virtual Summit in May 2021 between Piyush Goyal and EC VP Valdis Dombrovskis, where both agreed on a 'balanced, ambitious, comprehensive and mutually beneficial' Free Trade Agreement alongside other agreements. In 2026, the talks reached an advanced stage where both sides agreed to conclude the decades-old Free Trade Agreement on 27th January, 2026 EU-India Summit in New Delhi. The landmark agreement marks a historic deal between India and the European Union because, in recent times, the Trade Agreement has become a crucial one for both due to the recent shifts and realignments in geopolitical conditions around the world. The emerging trade agreement is expected to change the future of the automotive industry and the export and import of the same.





History of the Automotive Industry: Exports of the EU to India

On the other hand, one should consider that India's high tariffs on the automotive industry are a result of a wider trade strategy of protecting and nurturing the domestic automotive industry.

The automotive exports to India have historically been confined and restrictive for the EU. Germany, the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic are a few of the European countries that account for one of the biggest exporters of vehicles, but India imports a small fraction of EU automotive exports. Due to India's high tariffs on imports, which accounted to 125% in 2023 for fully built cars, the Indian market discouraged direct exports from Europe to India in the automotive sector; this resulted in India importing around \$330-340 million in motors and vehicles in 2024. Critics have debated that the measure confined the industry to inefficiencies, where domestic firms are less pressured for innovation and competition, whereas consumers paid premium prices for imported as well as locally produced vehicles, since competition was restricted.

On the other hand, one should consider that India's high tariffs on the automotive industry are a result of a wider trade strategy of protecting and nurturing the domestic automotive industry. This is due to the post-independence economic policy that emphasised import substitution industrialisation to reduce reliance on foreign goods. This policy has maintained a stringent focus on control of imports via tariffs and licensing, discouraging the import of goods primarily through high tariffs. Thus, European automotive companies have established manufacturing and assembly operations in India to produce cars for the domestic market as well as export the same in other countries; this localisation of production was in line with Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 'Made in India' vision.





On 27th January 2026, the EU-India FTA concluded the agreement, where the automotive sub-part of the EU-India FTA highlights a significant turn in the trade deal. The deal will considerably reduce the import duties on European cars from 125% to 40% and eventually to 10%. This move signifies an important turn of events for the Indian and European Markets and Economy by making European vehicle prices competitive in the Indian market. According to the agreement, the Electric Vehicles are expected to be excluded from the tariff brackets initially, for approximately five years, which significantly increases the market for the production and investment of Electric Vehicles. Trade between India and Europe is thus expected to surge due to tariff reductions, as well as complementary investment protection and legal harmonisation agreements that are still in draft.



India-EU Business Forum



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India's Automotive Tariff Structure and EU Export Trends from the late 1900s to the early 2020s

On the other hand, one should consider that India's high tariffs on the automotive industry are a result of a wider trade strategy of protecting and nurturing the domestic automotive industry.

The following graph (figure 1) elaborates on the evolution of import tariff rates and exports from the EU to India from 1999 onwards until 2026, and includes both exports of car parts and motor vehicles from the EU (divided as 'Germany' and 'Rest of Europe'), as well as the corresponding import tariff rate over the years. Through the years, one can easily decompose the time series into 3 regimes.

The first one is characterised by economic liberalisation and an exponential upward-sloping trend, which reached its peak in 2010. The second regime is a period of stagnation that began in 2010 and lasted until COVID-19. The third regime outlines the period spanning from COVID-19 up until 2026, and is particular for the resurgence of trade despite a high tariff regime, signalling potential external (non-tariff related) drivers of growth. In the paragraphs below, we briefly analyse each regime period in more detail.


Following India's economic liberalisation in 1991, the automotive sector emerged as a strategic priority for domestic industrial development. As seen in Figure 1, from 2000 to 2008, Indian tariff policy explicitly protected the nascent domestic vehicle manufacturing base through high tariffs on finished vehicles, which reached 110% by 2001 and remained elevated throughout the period. Simultaneously, the government maintained significantly lower tariffs on auto components (averaging 35–40% in the early 2000s, declining to 10% by 2008), a dual-tariff structure reflecting a deliberate policy objective: to attract foreign OEM assembly operations while reserving high-value vehicle assembly for Indian producers.



FIGURE 1.

EU TO INDIA

EVOLUTION OF IMPORT TARIFF RATES AND EXPORTS





This ‘tariff discrimination’ incentivised multinational manufacturers to establish assembly and component-sourcing facilities in India rather than exporting finished vehicles. Thus, EU trade data shows visible growth in component exports to India during 2004–2008, with exponential momentum peaking in 2007–2008 before the global financial crisis interrupted trajectories. Component tariffs fell from 40% (2001) to 10% (2008), directly enabling European suppliers to establish competitive cost positions with Indian OEMs. This phase thus predominantly showcases an economic model of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), with high finished-vehicle tariffs protecting domestic assembly and low component tariffs attracting global supply-chain integration.

The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis dramatically disrupted EU automotive exports globally. However, India's trade policy shifted toward renewed protectionism: component tariffs remained at 10–15%, but finished-vehicle tariffs stayed anchored at ~100% despite periodic adjustments. Critically, EU-India bilateral trade negotiations stalled entirely from 2013 onwards, leaving tariff structures frozen and creating policy uncertainty that deterred European exporters from investing in India-specific supply chains. EU automotive trade remained flat, seeing only marginal period growth and a sharp decline amidst the COVID-19 crisis in 2020, with component exports exhibiting minimal growth and vehicle exports suppressed by the high tariff barrier. This 12-year hiatus reflects political stalemate more than economic fundamentals: negotiation disagreements over intellectual property, regulatory harmonisation, and agricultural market access paralysed the FTA process. Meanwhile, India's domestic automotive sector matured under protection, with certain brands such as Maruti, Tata, Hyundai India, and Mahindra becoming globally competitive through import-substitution, which also reduced the urgency to liberalise.





However, post-2020, EU automotive exports to India experienced a dramatic resurgence, defying the high tariff environment. This paradoxical surge reflects two converging structural shifts. On one hand, the "China Plus One" supply-chain diversification after COVID-19 and US-China trade tensions, which motivated European manufacturers to de-risk supply chains away from China, repositioning India as a secondary manufacturing and export hub. On the other hand, India's policy shift via the Performance-Linked Incentive Scheme (2021–2028). The PLI scheme offers production subsidies to advanced automotive technology (EVs, hydrogen vehicles) and auto components, managing to attract USD \$8.1 billion in committed FDI, also interestingly showcasing some elements of legal harmonisation of India's standards with EU norms (particularly in BS-VI emissions and 6-airbag safety).

During that time, Germany's share of EU automotive exports to India rose from ~50% pre-2020 to >70% post-2020, reflecting the German manufacturers' strategic pivot toward India, and particularly the Volkswagen Group. In this period, vehicle tariffs remain nominally prohibitive, yet EU finished-vehicle exports accelerated, suggesting geopolitical necessity overrides tariff disadvantage. Similarly, component exports grew explosively, indicating substantial latent demand suppressed by pre-2020 tariff levels.

This historical pattern implies the FTA's tariff elimination for components will unlock dramatic trade expansion, validating the hypothesis that high vehicle tariffs have suppressed latent export potential. As such, the current expediting of negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement should be seen as part of a wider geopolitical realignment, the latter effectively changing the balance of incentives in favour of closer economic cooperation between the two partners. But just how much closer economic cooperation can one expect out of the deal?





Data Selection and Methodology:

The paper focuses on analysis of intermediary production stage products (Car Parts) and final production stages (Motor Vehicles).

To estimate the impact of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement on automotive trade flows, prices, and welfare the paper uses data from the World Bank's World Integrated Trading System (WITS) and the EU's COMEXT database, and employ a partial equilibrium trade model, following the standard Global Simulation Analysis of Industry-Level Trade Policy (GSIM) methodology (Francois and Hall, 2003). The model aims to quantify a) new trade created through increases in aggregate demand given a certain supply-side response (supply elasticity), b) trade diversion caused by displacement of existing supply given constant tariff rates for non-FTA suppliers, and c) equilibrium price effects.

The paper focuses on analysis of intermediary production stage products (Car Parts) and final production stages (Motor Vehicles). Specifically, we cover the HS-4 category 8703 Motor cars and other motor vehicles; principally designed for the transport of persons (other than those of heading no. 8702), including station wagons and racing cars, and HS-4 category 8708 Motor vehicles; parts and accessories, of heading no. 8701 to 8705.

The model's foundation rests on the Armington (1969) assumption that goods imported from different countries are imperfect substitutes differentiated by origin. This means that items sourced from different countries are viewed by consumers as fundamentally different and thus imperfectly substitutable between each other, which allows for non-1-on-1 variation between a substitution of foreign-sourced import X for foreign-sourced import Y. This assumption permits two-way trade, given that the EU simultaneously exports components to India while importing Indian-assembled vehicles and parts.





The paper treats demand and supply functions as fixed at the moment of a tariff change, following the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, where the elasticity of substitution measures the percentage change in quantity for each 1% relative price change. The paper derives the elasticity estimates from a literature review of econometric evidence on automotive trade. For automotive components (HS 8708), our substitution elasticity is calibrated from empirical estimates of auto-parts trade that embed a two-level CES structure and find relatively high substitution possibilities among foreign suppliers once contractibility and relationship-specific investments are controlled for. For finished vehicles (HS 8703), structural and reduced-form models of tariff shocks in the passenger car market, which consistently find more moderate demand responses due to brand loyalty, long replacement cycles, and the option for consumers to defer purchases or switch to second-hand vehicles.

On the supply side, the paper imposes export supply elasticities of 2 for both products, so that producers expand quantities along an increasing marginal cost curve when net-of-tariff prices rise. The supply elasticities are chosen in line with long-run manufacturing estimates used in partial equilibrium and computable general equilibrium applications, which typically adopt values in the range of 1 to 3 for industrial goods, reflecting the time needed to adjust capacity, reorganise supply chains, and meet regulatory standards.⁶

Trade creation accounts for trade that is newly generated through improved market access. Market access is the ability of foreign firms to sell goods and services in a country's market under the conditions set by the country (tariff and non-tariff measures). The mechanism is straightforward; when there is a tariff reduction, domestic import prices decline and expanding import demand given a substitution elasticity and effects on real income:

$$\Delta M = M_0 \times \sigma \times \frac{P_0}{\Delta P}$$





Trade Diversion occurs when changes in the tariff rate cause import substitution away from non-FTA suppliers toward India. Under CES, when the EU's tariff falls while other suppliers' tariffs remain the same, the EU's relative price advantage drives quantity substitution based on the following elasticity:

$$\Delta M_{diversion} = M_0 \times \sigma \times \left[\frac{\Delta P_{EU}}{P_{EU}} - \frac{\Delta \bar{P}_{others}}{\bar{P}_{others}} \right]$$

Similarly, a tariff reduction directly lowers domestic prices. The domestic price of imports can be generalised as being equal to the world price multiplied by the tariff rate:

$$P_{domestic} = P^* \times (1 + t)$$





Findings:

The negotiations faced challenges because of disagreements over high tariffs, market access, intellectual property, the automotive industry, and regulatory standards.

The findings indicate that a sharp reduction in the tariff rate results in positive effects for both motor vehicles (HS-4 8703) and car components (HS-4 8708), though the benefits are not evenly distributed across all EU countries or production chains.

On average, 70.2% of the trade benefits are derived from an increase in exports of automotive components (HS 8708) rather than finished vehicles (HS 8703). This is primarily due to a combination of factors including: a) the embeddedness of automotive components into the production of finished vehicles not only in the EU but also in India, b) the different replacement cycle between components and motor vehicles, c) differences in regulatory harmonization standards between individual components and vehicles, and d) the higher supply capacity of European component makers (which was treated as fixed at $\sigma=2$) vis-a-vis the corresponding Indian component makers which are largely operating near capacity. For all of these reasons, car components exhibit much higher demand elasticity than vehicles. Thus, although the decrease in tariff rates is much sharper for motor vehicles than for car components, the estimated trade benefits are influenced more by elasticity than by tariff differentials. This shows that, all else equal, in estimating trade benefits, elasticity is a stronger predictor of expected trade benefits than the flat tariff rate reduction.


As Figure 2 shows, the main beneficiaries of increases in motor vehicle exports are the Slovak Republic, Austria, and Hungary. These 3 countries serve predominantly as assembly stations for the German production chain (Volkswagen Group, BMW, Daimler Group). Conversely, the rest of the countries' benefits come predominantly from the export of automotive parts, with Italy and Sweden benefiting from both alike, consistent with the concentration of both car part production and assembly stages inside their national borders.



FIGURE 2.

EU AUTOMOTIVE TRADE

SHARE OF TRADE BENEFITS: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS VS MOTOR VEHICLES





As Figure 3 shows, the trade benefits are unevenly distributed across different countries. Of the EUR 1.003B in trade benefits, Germany stands out as it gains EUR 528M, or 52.68% of the total trade benefits, despite making up 30.21% of EU car manufacturing. The rest of the benefits are shared primarily by three production chains: the German, Italian, and Swedish. German car manufacturing makes up 35.7% of the EU market, with the biggest firms including the Volkswagen Group, Mercedes-Benz, and BMW. Out of these firms, Volkswagen Group is the most dispersed, with operations in the Slovak Republic (8.7% of EU car manufacturing), the Czech Republic (12.7% of EU car manufacturing), and Hungary (3.8% of EU car manufacturing).¹³ Collectively, these countries are responsible for approximately 60.9% of EU manufacturing, yet rip 73.4% of the additional trade exports in India.

Italian car manufacturing makes up 5.99% of EU car manufacturing, with Poland (4.3% of EU car manufacturing) acting as an important car part production country for the Stellantis Group, which includes the Fiat and Alfa Romeo brands, among others. The total trade benefits for this production chain are exactly 10%, despite collectively making up only 7.02% of the EU car manufacturing. Finally, Sweden, which only makes up 2.27% of EU car manufacturing, captures an extraordinary 7.91% of the additional exports to India, with Volvo being the dominant firm. Volvo maintains car part factories in Belgium, which makes up 0.81% of EU car manufacturing. Together, the two countries share 8.72% of the trade benefits, although Belgium only captures 0.81% of the new trade.




FIGURE 3.

TRADE GAINS VS MARKET SHARE

Who Benefits the Most in the EU?






Thus, an EU-India FTA leads to disproportionate benefits for Central European countries, as well as for Sweden and Italy, whilst being less relevant for France, Romania, and Spain. This is primarily due to the brand strategy of the main car manufacturing firms in the aforementioned countries, which are predominantly oriented towards the domestic (EU) market. By comparing the trade benefit (%) to the market share (%), one can create a ratio that shows how much a country overperforms in its expected export gains relative to its market size (Figures 4 and 5). The results indicate that Sweden, Austria, Germany, Italy, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary all benefit disproportionately to their respective market share, with Romania, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Poland, and the Czech Republic underperforming relative to their market share. Therefore, the former are the countries that stand to win the most from a comprehensive deal and swift implementation of tariff slashes in the HS-4 8703 and HS-4 8708 sub-chapters.

On the contrary, the French and Romanian production chains only gain 3.11% of the trade benefits, despite making up 14.48% of total EU car manufacturing. The Renault group dominates France and Romania, with car parts and assembly factories for Renault in France and Dacia in Romania. The PSA Group is another important firm in France with its 'Citroen' and 'Peugeot' brands. Finally, Spain, which represents 16.4% of EU car manufacturing, only captures 2% of the trade benefits. The primary brands in production in Spain are Seat and Cupra, which belong to Volkswagen Group.



FIGURE 4.

TRADE BENEFIT (%) TO MARKET SHARE (%)



SOURCE: WORLD BANK OFFICIAL BOUNDARIES

FIGURE 5.

TRADE GAINS VS MARKET SHARE

HIGHER VALUE INDICATIVES RELATIVE BENEFIT FROM EU-INDIA FTA

● TRADE BENEFIT %





FIGURE 6.

ESTIMATED NET TRADE EFFECT IN A 10% TARIFF SCENARIO

MOTOR VEHICLES (HS-4 8703)




IN MILLIONS OF USD

SOURCE: WORLD BANK OFFICIAL BOUNDARIES

FIGURE 7.

ESTIMATED NET TRADE EFFECT IN A 10% TARIFF SCENARIO

CAR PARTS (HS-4 8708)



IN MILLIONS OF USD
SOURCE: WORLD BANK OFFICIAL BOUNDARIES



Impact on China, Korea and the US due to the EU-India FTA

The US exported around 17% of production primarily to Georgia, Lithuania, and the UAE, and exported less than 0.1% to India as of 2025.

The India-Korea CEPA, which was effective since 2010, gave automotive components from South Korea to enter India at preferential duties of 0-5%, which was lower than the standard Most Favoured Nation(MFN) rate of 10%, whereas the automotive cars still face high import duties of 125%. Whereas China imports automotive components at 10% and 125% on Completely Built Units(CBU) cars.

Korea exported automotive components at a 15-18% share of India's 7.17 billion automotive industry, whereas China, which does not have any trade agreements or relaxation yet, exported automotive components at 26.7% share, which reflects the heavy reliance on cost-effective Chinese auto components over Korea. The market share of Korean automotive cars is less than 1% (which is limited to 5,000 to 10,000 imports of premium Korean cars annually) due to the high tariffs of 125% on CBU cars. (Figure 8) In 2025, Hyundai and Kia's market share in India had fallen by 3% due to the domestic competition with Mahindra and TATA. China, on the other hand, has 0.5% share of CBU cars, comprising 3,000 to 5,000 luxury/EV cars.

The US exported around 17% of production primarily to Georgia, Lithuania, and the UAE, and exported less than 0.1% to India as of 2025. US automotive exports to India in 2025 were below \$1 billion, which was mostly high-end EVs, high-end EVs-Tesla, that were exported in September 2025 as CBU. whereas other automotive components, such as Ford, Chevrolet, cannot export CBU to India due to 125% tariffs, whereas automotive components were exported from India to the USA for around 3.4 billion dollars in 2025. (Figure 8).




FIGURE 8.

GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE VALUE CHAIN

Winners & Losers

- NEW TRADE CREATED (CAR PARTS)
- NEW TRADE CREATED (MOTOR VEHICLES)
- EXISTING TRADE DIVERSION (CAR PARTS)
- EXISTING TRADE DIVERSION (MOTOR VEHICLES)
- PRICE EFFECTS (CAR PARTS)
- PRICE EFFECTS (MOTOR VEHICLES)





The EU-India FTA poses as a disadvantage for China and South Korea's automotive industry by granting European automotive industry a leverage on Indian automotive market by preferential tariff reduction on cars from 125% to 40% initially to 10% over 5-10 years and complete tariff elimination on automotive components, making EU cars and components cheaper significantly to Korea (CEPA 0-5% and CBU cars at 125%) and China (CBU cars at 125% and components at 10%). As seen earlier, Korean component exports that held a 15-18% share despite CEPA preference faced difficult competition as compared to China. After the trade deal signed between EU-India, Korea will face stiffer competition with the EU for exports of components and CBU cars, severely impacting the export market of Korea. Similarly, China's dominance of 26.7% in automotive components will see a reduction and shift India's reliance towards Europe.

The Trump government imposed high tariffs on India, which impacted auto component exports to the USA; the US has less than 1% market share for automobiles; therefore, the market share is expected to reduce further after the Trade deal signed by the EU and India.





The EU-India FTA is a historic geopolitical and economic shift from China and the US. India-China relation has been hostile and cautious for a few years, which escalated due to the Galwan clash resulting in border disarrangements. Despite the hostile relations sustained between the two countries, India is heavily dependent upon China's automotive components, EVs and electronics, which drives a large share in the Indian market. The EU, on the other hand, has shifted its focus to the 'China plus one' strategy by reducing dependence on the Chinese supply and market for automotive components. Similarly, the US has not been a reliable partner for the EU and India due to the growing high tariff imposition and growing economic and political tension. The uncertainties and unreliability of the two countries gives boost to the EU and India's market and economy by slashing tariffs on EU imports, and give boost to 'mother of all deals' to realign and convey a message that the geopolitical reorganisation boosts the market and economy of India and EU and are not majorly dependent upon the two major economic powers in the world.





Conclusion

It marks a historic shift that fosters trade creation and lowered tariffs, diverting exports from other major automotive exporters and positioning the EU as the unequivocal winner.

The EU-India FTA stands as a historic trade deal, referred to as 'Mother of all Deals', finalised on 27 January 2026, and establishes a landmark foundation for trade liberalisation by reducing tariffs on the European Union automotive industry from 40% initially to 10% over five years. The trade deal fundamentally shapes the future of the global automotive market landscape. It marks a historic shift that fosters trade creation and lowered tariffs, diverting exports from other major automotive exporters and positioning the EU as the unequivocal winner. The EU stands to benefit economically through a considerable reduction of tariffs on automotive cars and geopolitically positioning as India's most favoured exporter in the competitive automotive market. Major exporters stand as losers from the trade diversion, while the FTA becomes a fundamental channel for increased cooperation between the EU and India by realigning global supply chains and boosting geopolitical ties in a transformative geopolitical and economic realignment.





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**Pillars
of CREATION**

For a Distinctly Indian Take on World Affairs

Pillars *of* CREATION

For a Distinctly Indian Take on World Affairs

The Geostrata, with a commitment to fostering a comprehensive understanding of global dynamics and thereby promoting a distinctly Indian take on world affairs, has structured its expertise into distinct pillars of creation. These pillars represent a synthesis of profound research, informed perspectives, and proactive engagement in each domain.

In our "Strategic Studies" division, we delve into critical issues ranging from national security challenges, such as aerospace threats and terrorism, to focused areas like maritime and cybersecurity. Recognizing the pivotal role of international relations, our "Diplomacy" pillar spans geographic-specific desks, ensuring we maintain a nuanced perspective on global interactions.

Our commitment to sustainable futures is evident in our "Environment" section, where we tackle everything from energy security to biodiversity conservation. Meanwhile, the "Trade and Development" segment ensures a comprehensive understanding of both global trade dynamics and intricate nuances of India's economic sectors.

The "History and Culture Desk" stands as a testament to our belief in the importance of understanding our past, rich cultural heritage, and linguistic diversities. With the rapid advancements in the technological sphere, our "Science and Technology" division remains at the forefront, analyzing developments from nanotechnology to AI.

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